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"Value" Judgments: Accounts Receivable
Financing and Voidable Preferences Under
the New Bankruptcy Code
Neil B. Cohen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 re-
placing prior bankruptcy law with a new bankruptcy code (the
Code), has significantly changed the law governing accounts
receivable financing. 2 The new Code has broadened the bank-
ruptcy trustee's power to avoid a lender's security interest in
accounts receivable on grounds that the security interest con-
stitutes a voidable preference. Under the Code, the determina-
tion of a voidable preference depends upon a comparison of the
* Assistant Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the extraordinary assistance of Ms. Linda Scuorzo in
the preparation of this Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1160
(Supp. IV 1980)).
2. Accounts receivable financing is a major source of funds utilized by
businesses that sell their goods or services on open account, and that need
cash for their operations prior to payment of such accounts. See Reisman, The
Challenge of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act to Accounts Receivable and Inven-
tory Financing of Small to Medium-Sized Business, 83 CoM. L.J. 169, 175-77
(1978). Although, on occasion, a financial institution will make a simple loan to
a business and take as collateral certain currently existing accounts receivable
of that business, the typical financing arrangement is more complex, differing
from the simple collaterized loan in two respects. First, the typical accounts
receivable financing arrangement is one of revolving credit. That is, the busi-
ness may borrow additional amounts of money frequently without the neces-
sity of negotiating a new loan, so long as the aggregate loans outstanding do not
exceed a certain percentage, usually 60%-80%, of the face amounts of outstand-
ing "eligible" receivables. As debtors pay these receivables, the business re-
pays the aggregate loan from the proceeds. The repayments are not matched,
however, to particular loans. Id. More importantly, the typical receivables loan
is secured not only by all then-existing accounts receivable of the borrower, but
also by all future accounts receivable of the borrower. Thus, each receivable of
the borrower is collateral not only for the loan which it enabled, but also for all
past and future loans. Since the security interest 'floats" over all receivables of
the borrower, this type of security interest is often called a "floating lien." See,
e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SummERs, HANBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 1007 (2d ed. 1980).
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"value"3 of the accounts receivable at two different times.4 The
Code, however, fails to define "value." This omission has
caused great uncertainty for accounts receivable financers.
This uncertainty is significant because it affects the availa-
bility of collateral if the borrower does not satisfy the underly-
ing obligation. Creditors consider the availability of collateral
an important factor in determining the terms of a loan; indeed,
the availability of collateral often determines whether a lender
will extend credit at all.5 Moreover, a rational creditor, consid-
ering the availability of collateral as protection against a de-
faulting debtor, will assess the prospects of recovery both from
the debtor and, in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, from
the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee's power to avoid security
interests in accounts receivable is therefore an issue of great
practical concern. To assess the vitality of these security inter-
ests, and to evaluate the definition of "value" under the Code, it
is important to contrast the rights of secured creditors under
the prior bankruptcy law with their rights under current law.
Although the Code's treatment of security interests in inven-
tory and receivables is identical, the treatment of receivables
raises a more acute definitional problem. Hence the focus of
this Article is on receivables financing, although much of the
general analysis applies equally to inventory financing.
H1. TREATMENT UNDER THE 1898 ACT
Prior to the new Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,6 as
amended 7 (the 1898 Act), generated considerable controversy
concerning the effectiveness of a floating lien 8 on receivables or
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (Supp. IV 1980); notes 70-86 infra and accom-
panying text.
4. See notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32
Before the Subcomm on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1739-40 (1975-76) (statement of Frank-
lin Cole, Chairman of the Board of Walter Heller & Co.). Cf. Jackson &
Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protection of the Expectation Interest, 60
MIN. L. REV. 971, 988-89 (1976) (allowing a trustee in bankruptcy to use the
avoiding power to circumvent a secured creditor's bargained-for priorities could
conceivably lead to the eradication of the lender's security interest as a source
of collateral); Note, Preferential Transfers and the Value of the Insolvent Firm,
87 YALE L.J. 1449, 1459 n.67 (1978) (eliminating "the possibility of securing an
antecedent debt during insolvency [could] result in more bankruptcies, since
lenders unwilling to continue their support on an unsecured basis... would
then have no option but to fie against the debtors.").
6. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
7. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
8. See note 2 supra.
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inventory with respect to receivables or inventory created or
acquired during the period preceding bankruptcy.9 The se-
cured creditors, of course, sought to apply this collateral to the
debts owed to them, while trustees attacked the validity of the
creditors' security interests in order to increase the size of the
estate.
The heart of the trustees' attack on floating liens was the
doctrine of voidable preferences. Pursuant to section 60a of the
1898 Act, a preference was a transfer
of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for
or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor
while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against
him of the petition in bankruptcy... the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than some other creditor of the same class.10
Section 60b of the 1898 Act further provided that a trustee could
avoid such a preference and recover the transferred property if
the creditor, at the time of transfer, had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the debtor was insolvent." Seeking to augment their
debtors' estates, bankruptcy trustees frequently attempted to
avoid claims of secured creditors to accounts receivable or in-
ventory which had come into existence during the four months
before bankruptcy.' 2 The trustees argued that the debtor could
not transfer property until it came into existence and, there-
fore, that no account receivable was transferred until such
time. Thus, accounts coming into existence during the four
9. See, e.g., Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Ac-
quired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L REV. 194 (1959); Gordon,
The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUm. I- REv. 49 (1962); Henson, The In-
terpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 9 in the Bankruptcy
Courts, 22 U. Mmin L. REv. 101 (1967); Hogan, Games Lawyers Play With the
Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53
CoRmm. L. REV. 553 (1968); Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish
Creditors, 17 STAN. L. REv. 822 (1965); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2
and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518 (1960); King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Does It Insulate the Security Interest From Attack by a Trustee
in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L REv. 1117 (1966); Krause, Kripke & Seligson, The
Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired
Property, 42 N.Y.U. L RE V. 278 (1967); Riemer, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict
between Section 9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bank-
ruptcy Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63 (1965); Viles, The Uniform Commercial Code v. the
Bankruptcy Act, 55 Ky. L.J. 636 (1967).
10. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act
of June 22, 1938, Pub. I. No. 75-696, § 60a, 52 Stat. 840.
11. Id. § 60b.
12. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), and cases
cited therein.
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month period preceding bankruptcy were transferred during
that period for antecedent debts.13
In a series of cases14 beginning in 1967-Rosenberg v. Rud-
nick,15 Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and
Savings Co. ,16 and DuBay v. Williams' 7-the federal courts re-
jected the trustees' argument as applied to receivables and in-
ventory financing under the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).18 These cases cited a variety of policy grounds and
inventive doctrines to justify their refusal to allow the trustee
to avoid the security interests,' 9 but common to all these cases
13. See, e.g., id. at 1287.
14. These cases all involved debts governed by states' enactments of the
1962 version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
15. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
16. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
17. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
18. 417 F.2d at 1287-88; 408 F.2d at 212-13; 262 F. Supp. at 638-39.
19. The cases raised three theories supporting the secured creditors'
claims which have practical appeal, but which are at best only subsidiary argu-
ments. First among these theories is the "entity" or "Mississippi River" theory.
Under this theory, individual accounts receivable and items of inventory are
not discrete items of collateral, but, rather, are parts of one large res ("inven-
tory" or "receivables") which is the collateral. See 417 F.2d at 1287 n.8; 408 F.2d
at 216; 262 F. Supp. at 639. Thus, assuming that the security interest was origi-
nally granted more than four months before bankruptcy, although individual
components of the entity known as inventory or receivables may have become
part of that mass during the four months preceding bankruptcy, the security
interest in the mass itself was transferred before that period and, therefore,
cannot constitute a preference. Professor Henson has popularized this theory
under the rubric of the "Mississippi River" theory, pointing out that a hypothet-
ical creditor who took a security interest in the Mississippi River and filed ap-
propriate financing statements more than four months before bankruptcy
should not be deprived of that collateral upon bankruptcy merely because
some of the water in the river was not part of the river four months earlier, and
some water which had been part of the river four months earlier was no longer
in the river. See, e.g., R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 281-82 n.57 (2d ed. 1979). Though this argu-
ment has some appeal, it reveals some deficiencies upon close analysis. In par-
ticular, it does not account for changes in the water level of the river. In other
words, it does not justify upholding a security interest in a res which has in-
creased in size.
The second theory raised in these cases, closely related to the entity the-
ory, is known as the "substitution of collateral" doctrine. Under this theory, in-
ventory and receivables coming into the debtor's possession during the last
four months function as substitutes for the inventory bought prior to the four
month period and sold within it and accounts created outside the period and
collected within it. 408 F.2d at 217. See also R. HENSON, supra, at 281, 289. The
doctrine, however, does not account for collateral received in the four month
period in excess of collateral liquidated in that span.
Finally, these cases rely on a controversial section of the U.C.C. to insulate
receivables and inventory financing from attack. U.C.C. § 9-108 provides that
when a secured party makes an advance
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired property
his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to
[Vol. 66:639
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was a single interpretation of the relevant statutes.20 The
courts' interpretations all relied, at least in part, on the clear
definition in the 1898 Act of the moment at which a transfer was
deemed to take place. Subsection 60a(2) of the 1898 Act pro-
vided that
a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that
no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights
of the transferee.2 1
Under the U.C.C., a creditor's security interest in after-acquired
collateral is not perfected until it attaches,2 2 and attachment
does not occur until the debtor has rights in the collateral.23
Thus, a security interest in an account receivable which does
not yet exist, and, accordingly, in which the debtor-the ac-
count creditor-does not yet have rights, has not attached and
is not perfected.
As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Grain Merchants, how-
ever, once a secured creditor files a financing statement with
respect to a floating lien on receivables or inventory, no subse-
quent lien creditor can achieve priority over the secured credi-
tor, even though the security interests with respect to after-
acquired collateral are not yet perfected.24 In the case of a
perfected floating lien on inventory or receivables, therefore, no
voidable preference can result as long as the financing state-
ment was filed more than four months before bankruptcy, since
be taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the
debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary
course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant
to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is
given.
As the official comments indicate, the purpose of section 9-108 is to insulate af-
ter-acquired collateral, such as inventory and receivables, from attack as voida-
ble preferences. Id. at Comment 1. Although by its terms section 9-108 would
seem to achieve that result, there is a significant problem involved in applying
the section. Subsection 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544, as amended by Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840,
specifically defined the moment a transfer was deemed to be made for the pur-
poses of voidable preference analysis. Inasmuch as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
was a federal statute and section 9-108 is, where enacted, a state statute, by vir-
tue of the supremacy clause of the Constitution of the United States, U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cL 2, any inconsistency would be resolved by giving effect to the
Bankruptcy Act if inconsistent with the U.C.C.
20. 417 F.2d at 1287; 408 F.2d at 212-13; 262 F. Supp. at 637-38.
21. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act
of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 60a, 52 Stat. 840.
22. See U.C.C. § 9-303.
23. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1972 version); U.C.C. § 9-204 (1962 version).
24. 408 F.2d at 212-13. See also DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d at 1287-88.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the transfers of security interests are deemed to have taken
place at the time of filing.25 This analysis of the 1898 Act, al-
though widely debated among commentators, became domi-
nant in the courts.26
III. TREATMENT UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A significant change in the principles governing the validity
in bankruptcy of floating liens in inventory and receivables was
developing even before Rosenberg, Grain Merchants, and Du-
Bay. In 1966, the National Bankruptcy Conference established
the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code, chaired by Professor Grant Gil-
more (the Gilmore Committee).27 The Gilmore Committee pro-
posed significant changes in section 60a of the 1898 Act 28 which
became the basis of section 4-607 proposed by the Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 29 This proposal has
survived largely intact as section 547 of the Code,30 albeit with
significant tinkering and rewriting.
When the Gilmore Committee began its inquiry in 1966, it
was primarily concerned with the possibility that no after-ac-
quired security interests in receivables or inventory would sur-
vive a trustee's attack. Thus, an initial goal of the Gilmore
Committee was to grant greater protection to inventory and
receivables financers.3 1 The advent of Rosenberg, Grain
Merchants, and DuBay, however, rendered the Committee's
proposals and the eventual statute more restrictive than sec-
tion 60a as ultimately interpreted. An examination of the oper-
ation of section 547 with respect to receivables financing is
essential to determine the extent of the new limits on the abil-
25. This analysis applies even though the security interests were not per-
fected, and indeed, the collateral did not even exist until much later.
26. See, e.g., Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1973);
Speciner v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 471 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), affd, 600 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979). See also, e.g., NATIONAL BANxUPrcy CON-
FERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE COORDINATION OF THE BANKRuPrcy
ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 204, 207-08, and in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6164,
6167-68; Harrington, Insecurity for Secured Creditor--The Floating Loan and
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Act, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 466 (1980).
27. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 204, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6164, 6167-69.
28. Id. at 209-10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6169-
70.
29. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANxuUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNIrED STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11 at 166-75 (1973).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV 1980).
31. See note 27 supra.
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ity of receivables and inventory creditors to retain effective se-
curity interests after bankruptcy.32
Section 547(b)33 of the Code contains the five elements of a
voidable preference.34 According to section 547(b):
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
3 5
The first element of a preference-to or for the benefit of a
creditor-is clearly satisfied by the granting of a security inter-
est in accounts receivable to a lender, since the lender is by
definition a creditor.36
The second element-for an antecedent debt owed before
the transfer-is a key element in any financing arrangement,
including accounts receivable financing, involving security in-
terests in after-acquired property. To determine whether a
transfer was made for an antecedent debt, one must first deter-
mine when that transfer was made. Subsection 547(e) (2)37 de-
termines the time at which a transfer of property is deemed to
be made for the purpose of section 547 analysis.38 It provides:
For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of
this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and
32. For a broader analysis of the operation of section 547, see 4 L. KING,
COLTER ON BANKRUPTCY 547 (15th ed. 1979).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
34. "If any one of the elements of a preference.. . is wanting, a preference
under [section] 547 has not been established." 4 L. KING, supra note 32, at
547.11 n.21. Accor4 In re Suppa, 8 B.R. 720, 722 (Bankr. DR.L 1981).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
36. See id. § 101(9).
37. Id. § 547(e) (2).
38. See, e.g., In re Meritt, 7 B.R. 876, 878 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
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the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days
after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected
after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
transfer is not perfected at the later of
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee.39
The time of a transfer thus depends on the moment the trans-
fer is perfected.
Subsection 547(e)(1)(B)40 indicates that a transfer of per-
sonal property, including accounts receivable, is deemed per-
fected 41 for purposes of subsection (e) (2) "when a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to
the interest of the transferee." 42 This test for perfection is sub-
stantively identical to the definition of time of transfer appear-
ing in section 60a(2) of the 1898 Act.43 As the Grain Merchants
and DuBay cases demonstrated, once a creditor files a financ-
ing statement covering a security interest in after-acquired col-
lateral, no judicial lien creditor may be superior to the secured
creditor.4 4 Therefore, pursuant to subsection 547(e) (1) (B), a
security interest in after-acquired accounts receivable is per-
fected for bankruptcy purposes when the creditor files a prop-
erly completed financing statement.
Reading subsection 547(e) (2) with this understanding of
perfection, it is apparent that when a financing statement is
filed within ten days after the security interest is created,45
subsection (e) (2) (A) determines the moment at which the
transfer is deemed to take place. The rule of subsection
(e) (2) (A) indicates that, subject to subsection (e) (3), a trans-
fer is deemed to have taken place "at the time such transfer
takes effect between the transferor and transferee."4 6 Accord-
ingly, a transfer of a security interest in after-acquired accounts
39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (Supp. rV 1980) (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 547(e)(1)(B). See In re Durkay, 9 B.R. 58, 62 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981).
41. Section 547(e) (1) is similar, but not identical, to the U.C.C. definition of
perfection. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1) (Supp. IV 1980) with U.C.C. §§ 9-302 -
9-306 (1977).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1980).
43. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
44. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
45. This should, of course, occur in all competently administered transac-
tions. See C. FuNE:, BANKs AND = UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 36 (2d ed.
1964).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. IV 1980).
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receivable takes place at the creation of the security interest.
Therefore, if the indebtedness does not predate the creation of
the security interest, the transfer is not for an antecedent debt.
The rule of subsection (e) (2) is subject, however, to the ex-
ception in subsection (e) (3) that "[f]or the purposes of [sec-
tion 547] a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred."47 The debtor who has ex-
tended credit on account cannot have rights in an account re-
ceivable until the account exists. Thus, pursuant to subsection
(e) (3), security interests in accounts receivable that come into
existence after the initial extension of the secured credit by the
lender to the account creditor are not deemed transferred until
such accounts come into existence, and thus after the creation
of the debt secured thereby.4 8 The transfers are, accordingly,
"for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made."4 9 The second element of a
preferential transfer is therefore satisfied.
The third element of a preferential transfer--occurrence
while the debtor was insolvent-depends on the above analysis
of the timing of the transfer. Since a transfer of a security in-
terest in an account receivable is not deemed to have occurred
until the creation of the receivable, the third element of a pref-
erence is satisfied if the debtor was insolvent 0 at the time the
account receivable was created. It is important in this regard to
note that section 547(f)51 creates a presumption that a debtor
was insolvent during the ninety days prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.
The fourth element-transfer within the statutory time pe-
riod-is also dependent on the determination of the time of
transfer. In cases in which the transferee was not an insider52
with cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, a transfer
fulfills this criterion of voidability if it was made "on or within
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition."5 3 Since,
47. Id. § 547(e) (3).
48. Cf. In re Cox, 10 BJ.R 268, 271 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (transfer does not
occur until debtor has rights in collateral).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1980).
50. The Code uses a modified balance sheet approach to insolvency. See
id. § 101(26).
51. Section 547(f) provides that: "For the purposes of this section, the
debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immedi-
ately preceding the date of the filing of the petition." Id. § 547(f).
52. For the definition of insider, see id. § 101(25).
53. Id. § 547(b) (4) (A). In cases in which the transferee was an insider
with cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, the time period is extended
to one year. Id. § 547(b) (4) (B).
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pursuant to section 547(e), the transfer of a security interest in
an account receivable is not deemed to occur until that receiva-
ble comes into existence, 54 security interests with respect to re-
ceivables which come into existence within the ninety day
period prior to the filing of a petition will necessarily fulfill this
fourth criterion.
The fifth element-improvement over the creditor's share
of a Chapter 7 distribution55-invites complex calculations. As
Professors White and Summers have observed, however, it is
an element that will virtually always be fulfilled if the transfer
satisfies the first four elements of section 547(b), since the as-
sets of the bankrupt estate are usually insufficient to fully sat-
isfy the claims of all creditors.5 6
A typical accounts receivable financing arrangement illus-
trates the application of section 547(b). Assume that the First
National Bank entered into an arrangement with Failing Indus-
tries on January 1, pursuant to which First National Bank
would loan funds to Failing Industries secured by a security in-
terest in all present and future accounts receivable of the com-
pany. Assume in addition that Failing Industries filed a
bankruptcy petition on July 5. Finally, assume that all the ac-
counts receivable owned by Failing Industries on July 5 re-
sulted from sales occurring within the previous ninety days.
The vitality of First National Bank's claim to the accounts re-
ceivable of Failing Industries depends in part on whether the
trustee can avoid, as a preference, the security interest in any
of the accounts receivable.
To establish a voidable preference, the elements of section
547(b) must be satisfied. The First National Bank is a creditor
of Failing Industries, 5 7 and the granting of a security interest is
a transfer;5 8 therefore, Failing Industries has made a transfer to
a creditor. In addition, the transfer is for an antecedent debt.
The debt secured by the accounts receivable was created on
54. Id. § 547(e) (3).
55. Id. §§ 701-766. Under Chapter 7, the trustee liquidates all of the
debtor's nonexempt assets and distributes the proceeds to the creditors on a
pro rata basis in the order of their priority. See id. § 726.
56. See J. WmmE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMmERCIAL CODE 875 (1st ed. 1972) (discussing § 60a of the 1898 Act).
See also In re Dennis, BA~NK. L. REP. (CCH) 68,297 (7th Cir. 1981) for an in-
sightful analysis of this problem.
57. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. IV 1980) defines "transfer" as: "every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention
of title as a security interest." (emphasis added).
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January 1. All of the accounts receivable which served as col-
lateral on July 5 came into existence during the ninety days
prior to July 5. Pursuant to the time-of-transfer rules of section
547(e), 59 the security interests were deemed transferred to the
First National Bank during that period, and were therefore
transferred for a preexisting debt. Moreover, section 547(f)60
provides that Failing Industries was presumptively insolvent
during the ninety-day period preceding the filing of its bank-
ruptcy petition. Since the transfer of the security interests in
the receivables occurred when the receivables were created-
during the ninety days before the petition was filed-the trans-
fers were made while the debtor is presumed to have been in-
solvent. The time-of-transfer rules also establish that the
transfers occurred within ninety days preceding the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Finally, assuming that the assets of
Failing Industries are insufficient to pay unsecured creditors as
fully as the First National Bank, the security interest in the re-
ceivables would enable the First National Bank to receive a
greater portion of the amount owed to it than it would receive
under Chapter 7. Thus, all five criteria of section 547(b) are
satisfied.
Satisfaction of the section 547(b) criteria does not, how-
ever, ensure that the trustee can avoid the security interests of
First National Bank in the accounts receivable of Failing Indus-
tries. Section 547(b) states that fulfillment of all five criteria
creates a voidable preference "except as provided in subsection
(c)."61 Section 547(c) 62 must therefore be examined in order to
determine whether the security interests survive the trustee's
attack.
Section 547(c) describes six types of transfers which, al-
though falling within the criteria of section 547(b), are not void-
able by the trustee. The exception relevant to receivables
financing appears in subsection 547(c) (5),63 which significantly
limits the reach of section 547(b) with respect to security inter-
ests in accounts receivable and inventory. Although section
547(b) would declare all such security interests in accounts
arising after the initial advance of funds and within ninety days
before bankruptcy to be preferential, subsection 547(c) (5) pro-
vides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer
59. See notes 37-51 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 51 supra.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
62. Id. § 547(c).
63. Id. §547(c)(5).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the pro-
ceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such
transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the
filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding un-
secured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such se-
curity interest exceeded the value of all security interest for such debt
on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b) (4) (A) of
this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b) (4) (B) of
this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of
the petition; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest.64
This subsection reverses the broad sweep of section 547(b)
by limiting the trustee's avoidance powers. Under this section
the trustee may avoid security interests in receivables and in-
ventory only to the extent that there has been, in the aggregate,
a reduction of the amount by which the secured debt exceeded
the value of the collateral between the date ninety days before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition65 and the date of the filing
of the petition. In other words, if a debt secured by a floating
lien on accounts receivable is undersecured 66 ninety days67
before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, but is less under-
secured or not undersecured at all on the date of bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy trustee may avoid the security interests to the
extent that they represent such an improvement in position of
the secured creditor. This test has become widely known, not
surprisingly, as the "improvement in position test."68
Application of the subsection 547(c) (5) improvement in po-
sition limitation to the Failing Industries example is necessary
to determine whether, and to what extent, the bankruptcy
trustee may avoid the security interest of First National Bank
in the accounts receivable of Failing Industries. Assume that
on July 5, the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Fail-
ing Industries owed First National Bank $80,000, secured by ac-
counts receivable with a "value" of $75,000. Assume further
64. Id.
65. In the case of insiders with reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent, this period is extended to one year. Id. § 547(c) (5) (A) (ii). In either
case, however, the period begins no earlier than the first extension of secured
credit. Id. § 547(c) (5) (B).
66. An undersecured debt is one which exceeds the value of the collateral,
in this example, the accounts receivable.
67. Or, in the case of insiders, one year. See note 65 supra.
68. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 374, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6330; L. KiNG, supra note 32, at 1 547.41.
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that on April 6, ninety days before the filing of the petition,
Failing Industries owed First National Bank $120,000, secured
by accounts receivable with a "value" of $100,000. Applying the
voidability rules of sections 547(b) and (c), the bankruptcy
trustee may avoid the transfer of security interests in receiv-
ables to First National Bank, but only to the extent that First
National Bank improved its position in the ninety days before
bankruptcy. Inasmuch as the indebtedness of Failing Indus-
tries exceeded the "value" of collateral on April 6 by $20,000
while the indebtedness exceeded the "value" of the collateral
on July 5 by only $5,000, First National Bank has improved its
position between those two dates by $15,000. Therefore, the se-
curity interest of First National Bank in the accounts receivable
of Failing Industries would be voidable to that extent. This re-
sult contrasts sharply with the probable disposition of the case
under the 1898 Act, as interpreted in DuBay and Grain
Merchants69 the former law would not have recognized a pref-
erence in this situation.
IV. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
The foregoing analysis ignores a significant problem. The
determination as to whether a preference exists depends on a
comparison of the difference between the "value" of the collat-
eral and the amount of debt secured thereby at two points in
time. The Code, along with state law incorporated therein, de-
fines each concept leading to this crucial comparison with one
major exception-the concept of "value." Nevertheless, the def-
inition of "value" can determine the existence and magnitude
of a preference, and can affect the allocation of the scarce re-
sources of a bankrupt's estate between secured and unsecured
creditors. Despite its significance, however, there is no single
obvious definition which can satisfy the section 547 algorithm.
The Code contains no definition of the term "value" as
used in section 547. Although the phrase "new value" is de-
fined in section 547(a), 70 that definition concentrates on new-
ness and uses "value" in the sense of consideration, rather than
69. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
"new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services or new
credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to
such transferree in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by
the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, but does not in-
elude an obligation substituted for an existing obligation.
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as a measurable quantity. Since, under subsection 547(c) (5),
"value" is a concept that must be measured, the section 547(a)
definition is not useful. Similarly, the general definitional sec-
tion of the Code7' provides no help in defining "value."
In addition, analogies and references to other sections of
the Code provide no significant guidance in determining the
meaning of "value." Section 52272 of the Code, which grants ex-
emptions from the debtor's estate, uses "value" in the quantifi-
able sense in which it is used in subsection 547(c) (5).
Although section 522 defines "value" as the "fair market value
as of the date of the filing of the petition,"73 the introductory
language of that section stipulates that the definition applies
only to that section, and thus is irrelevant to other sections of
the Code.7 4
Section 506(a) 75 of the Code contains arguably relevant
language, but is ultimately of little assistance. That section
prevents secured creditors from having claims against a bank-
rupt's estate to the extent that such claims will be satisfied by
collateral, and thereby allocates an undersecured claim be-
tween its secured and unsecured components. 76 The purpose
of section 506, like that of its predecessor, section 57h of the
1898 Act,77 is to allow "those having security... [to] get the
benefit of that security, but ... at the expense of reducing the
claim upon which they are entitled to participate as a general
creditor"7 -that is, "to deduct the security from the debt."79
To "deduct the security from the debt," the value of the secur-
ity must be determined. Section 506(a) provides that "[s]uch
71. Id. § 101.
72. Id. § 522.
73. Id.§ 522(a)(2).
74. Id. § 522(a).
75. Id. § 506(a).
76. Section 506(a) provides in relevant part that-
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553
of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such credi-
tor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent
of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an un-
secured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or
the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed
claim.
Id.
77. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act
of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 57h, 52 Stat. 840. See also 11 U.S.c.
§ 506(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
78. In re O'Gara Coal Co., 12 F.2d 426, 429 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 271 U.S.
683 (1926).
79. New York Trust Co. v. Palmer, 101 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1939).
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value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valua-
tion and of the proposed disposition or use of such property,
and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use
or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest."80 The relevance
of the section 506 definition of "value" for present purposes is
debatable. The goal of that definition is not to define or deter-
mine the validity of a security interest. Rather, section 506 re-
quires valuation of valid security interests in order to subtract
their value from general unsecured claims against the estate.
The section is totally irrelevant to subsidiary determinations of
the "value" of some items of property at certain times for the
purpose of analyzing the validity of asserted security interests
under section 547.
Even if section 506 were relevant, its prescription for value
would be of little assistance. The statement that "value shall
be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation," stand-
ing apart from the remainder of the sentence, suggests only
that the definition of value for section 547 analysis should be
determined rationally. The remaining portions of the sentence
merely add precautionary language suited not to section 547
but, rather, to distinctions between proceedings in Chapters 7
and 1181 and subsequent hearings.82
The decision by Congress to leave "value" undefined for
purposes of section 547 is perplexing. This is not an instance in
which Congress has described broad parameters for the courts
to apply to specific facts on a case-by-case basis. Nor does the
English language supply the relevant meaning, since "value"
can have several meanings, each of which would mandate dif-
ferent results. Rather, Congress inserted an extremely vague
but fundamental term in an otherwise mathematically precise
formula.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 83 in-
dicates that the lack of definition was not accidental. The 1970
report of the Gilmore Committee 84 suggested statutory lan-
guage embodying an improvement in position test. Although
this language85 was quite different from the wording of section
80. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
81. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
82. See 3 L. KING, supra note 32, at 1 506.
83. See generally HR. REP. No. 595, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787-6573.
84. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Committee's proposed section 60a(4)IV provided-
If inventory is acquired or receivables arise in the ordinary course of a
debtor's business and become collateral covered by a security agree-
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547 as ultimately enacted, the Committee also used the term
"value" without defining it. In its commentary on the proposed
revision, however, the Gilmore Committee stated:
The comparison of values at the two measuring points which the Draft
requires poses problems of obvious difficulty. A statutory valuation
formula would have been helpful. The Committee has considered a
number of suggested formulas but has been unable to come up with a
satisfactory one. The valuation problem is, therefore, left to the refer-
ees and judges.8 6
In the eight years between the issuance of the Gilmore Com-
mittee report and the enactment of the Code, the problem ap-
parently was never again addressed, and no additional
references to the definition of "value" appear in the legislative
history.
V. POSSIBLE DEFINITIONS OF "VALUE"
The search for a definition of "value" for use in section 547
is not a mere intellectual exercise seeking an elegant solution
for a conceptual lacuna; it is a practical problem in the opera-
tion of a system which often holds the key to the allocation of
hundreds of thousands of dollars of a debtor's assets. The de-
termination of an appropriate definition requires identification
of the various possible definitions, as well as criteria for evalu-
ating the definitions in light of their likely effects and the goals
of the bankruptcy system. Although it has been over a decade
since the Gilmore Committee specifically highlighted the need
for a definition of "value," neither Congress nor the commenta-
tors have given the matter any serious analysis.8V
ment, a perfected transfer of such inventory or receivables or the pro-
ceeds of either is not avoidable except to the extent that the transferee
has improved his position under the rule next stated. The transferee
has "improved his position" if (a) a deficiency existed on the date four
months before the filing of the petition, or if new value was first given
under the relevant security agreement during the four-month period,
on the date new value was first given; and (b) that deficiency, on the
date of filing the petition, has been reduced or converted into a surplus.
The term "deficiency" means the amount by which the debt secured
exceeds the aggregate value of the inventory, receivables or proceeds
which are collateral for the debt. The transferee has the burden of es-
tablishing that he has not improved his position under the rules above
stated. To the extent that a transfer is voidable under this subpara-
graph IV, it is voidable without regard to whether the debtor was insol-
vent at any date prior to the date of filing the petition or whether the
transferee had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of any transfer.
HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 211, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6171.
86. Id. at 216, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6176.
87. Indeed, very few have even noticed the matter. A few commentators,
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There are at least five possible definitions of the term
",value":88
- Face Value. The value of each account receivable would
be defined as the amount owed on the account by the account
debtor.
- Market Value. The value of each account receivable
would be defined as the amount for which the receivable could
have been sold on the market at the relevant time.89
- Collection Value. The value of each account receivable
would be defined as the money actually collected on the ac-
count by the account creditor or trustee in bankruptcy, possibly
as adjusted for the time value of money.
- Loan Value. The value of each account receivable would
be defined as the amount of money the lender actually loaned
to the account creditor with such receivable as collateral.
- Book Value. The value of each account receivable would
be defined as the net value as reflected in the books of the ac-
count creditor according to generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples-presumably face value minus reserves for returned
goods and uncollectable accounts.
A reexamination of the financing arrangement between the
First National Bank and Failing Industries demonstrates that
the choice of definition can be the critical factor in determining
whether a preference exists and, if so, its magnitude. Suppose
that First National Bank loaned Failing Industries eighty per-
cent of the face amount of the latter's accounts receivable, se-
cured by a security interest in all present and future accounts
receivable. Assume further that Failing Industries filed a bank-
ruptcy petition on July 5. In addition, assume that on April 6-
ninety days earlier-the loan balance was $120,000, secured by
accounts receivable with a face amount of $150,000, and that on
July 5 the loan balance was $80,000, secured by accounts receiv-
able with a face amount of $100,000; also, all receivables were
"rolled over" during the ninety days prior to filing, so that none
of the July 5 receivables existed on April 6. Assume also that
relying on the principle stated in section 506, have suggested that "value" might
be defined differently in liquidation cases than in reorganization cases, but
have failed to suggest any usable definitions. See, e.g., 4 I KING, supra note 32,
at 547.41.
88. Obviously these approaches can be combined in various ways to result
in a myriad of possible definitions.
89. This approach could be combined with Loan Value to yield a similar
definition that values an account receivable as the amount a reasonable
financer would loan with such receivable as collateral.
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$107,000 of the April 6 receivables and $75,000 of the July 5 re-
ceivables were actually collected. Hypothesize in addition that
a reasonable factor would have paid $125,000 for the April 6 re-
ceivables but only $50,000 for the July 5 receivables. Finally, as-
sume that at all times Failing Industries carried on its books a
reserve account for uncollectable receivables in the amount of
twenty-five percent of the face amount of all outstanding
receivables.
To determine whether any or all of the July 5 receivables
constitute a preferential transfer to First National Bank that
the bankruptcy trustee can avoid, one must apply the improve-
ment in position test of section 547.90 To apply that test, how-
ever, one must know the "value" of the receivables on both
April 6 and July 5. The analysis will vary depending upon
which definition of "value" is used.
If, for example, "value" is defined as face value, the prefer-
ence analysis would be quite simple. On both April 6 and July
5, the face value of the accounts receivable exceeded the debt;91
therefore, at neither point would the debt be deemed under-
secured. Thus, no preference could be found.
On the other hand, the market value definition of "value"
mandates a different method of analysis. On April 6, the
"value" of the collateral was $125,000, while its "value" on July 5
was $50,000. Once again, no preference results, since First Na-
tional Bank was not undersecured on April 6 and, therefore,
could not have improved its position.
Application of a collection value definition to the case of
Failing Industries, however, will result in the finding that a
preferential transfer occurred. Under the collection value defi-
nition, the debt exceeded the "value" of the collateral on April
6 by $13,000,92 while the debt exceeded the "value" of the collat-
eral on July 5 by only $5,000.93 The First National Bank im-
proved its position by $8,000 between April 6 and July 5, and
section 547 would therefore indicate that the transfers to the
bank of the security interests in the July 5 receivables are void-
able to the extent of $8,000.94
Defining "value" as loan value leads to a determination that
90. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
91. On April 6, the face value of the receivables was $150,000, while the
loan balance was only $100,000. On July 5, the face value of the receivables was
$100,000, while the loan balance was only $80,000.
92. Debt of $120,000 minus "value" of collateral of $107,000.
93. Debt of $80,000 minus "value" of collateral of $75,000.
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (5) (Supp. IV 1980).
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no preference was created. On April 6, the value of both the
debt and the collateral was $120,000, while on July 5 the value of
both the debt and the collateral was $80,000. Under this defini-
tion, the bank did not improve its position and, accordingly, the
transfers of security interests are not voidable.
Finally, if "value" means book value, a voidable preference
will be found. Utilizing this approach, the receivables on both
April 6 and July 5 had a value, according to the books of Failing
Industries, of seventy-five percent of their face amount -
$112,500 for the April 6 receivables and $75,000 for the July 5 re-
ceivables. Therefore, on April 6, the bank was undersecured by
$7,500-collateral with a value of $112,500 securing a loan of
$120,000--while on July 5 it was undersecured by only $5,000-
collateral with a value of $75,000 securing a debt of $80,000. Pur-
suant to section 547, First National Bank received a preference
to the extent of its $2,500 improvement in position.
The case of Failing Industries demonstrates that the choice
of the definition of "value" in subsection 547(c) (5) will deter-
mine the existence and magnitude of voidable preferences in a
large number of receivables financing transactions. The choice
of definition will have a significant impact on financers, borrow-
ers, general creditors, and bankruptcy trustees. A definition
not only will conclusively determine the voidability of particu-
lar security interests in accounts receivable, but also will influ-
ence creditors' decisions as to the advisability of particular
transactions.
VI. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE DEFINITION
Interpretation of ambiguous statutes is always a difficult,
uncertain undertaking. Interpretation of subsection 547(c) (5)
is particularly difficult. Standard canons of statutory interpre-
tation and construction9 5 are of little avail when the statute to
be interpreted is susceptible of many logical readings, and
when the legislative history provides little guidance.9 6
Two of the posited definitions of "value," however, can be
quickly eliminated from consideration. A cardinal rule of statu-
tory interpretation, including interpretation of bankruptcy stat-
utes, is that "the intent of the legislature is, and must be, the
primary consideration."97 Although Congress has not provided
95. See generally, e.g., C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(4th ed. 1973) (a revision of Sutherland Statutory Construction).
96. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
97. E. CRAwFoRD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 331 (1940).
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any substantial indication of its intent in using the word
"4value," it has given ample guidance concerning one major re-
sult intended by the statutory scheme of which subsection
547(c) (5) is an integral part. As the House of Representatives
report on section 54798 makes clear, one major goal of section
547 was to overrule the doctrine of Grain Merchants and Du-
Bay. The report states that subsection 547(c) (5)
codifies the improvement in position test, and thereby overrules such
cases as DuBay v. Williams and Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v.
Union Bank and Savings Co.... A creditor with a security interest in
a floating mass, such as inventory or accounts receivable is subject to
preference attack to the extent that he improves his position during
the 90-day period before bankruptcy.99
The report thus assumes that the improvement in position test
of subsection 547(c) (5) will yield a result different from the ap-
plication of the DuBay-Grain Merchants rule.
The loan value and face value definitions of "value," how-
ever, will in most cases lead to the same result-a finding of no
preference-as would the rule in DuBay and Grain Merchants.
In a typical accounts receivable financing arrangement, the
financer loans the debtor only a portion of the face amount of
the receivables; accordingly, the debt secured will always be
less than the face amount of the receivables and, under the
face value definition, less than the "value" of the collateral.
Under the loan value definition, the "value" of the collateral is
defined as equal to the debt secured thereby. Thus, under ei-
ther definition, no loan will ever be undersecured. Because
pursuant to subsection 547(c) (5), a voidable preference will re-
sult only if a secured creditor improves its position with regard
to an undersecured loan, neither definition will ever lead to a
voidable preference. Therefore, the face value' 00 and loan
value definitions fail to satisfy Congress's intent in adopting
the improvement in position test and should be abandoned.
Book value should also be rejected as a definition of
"value." Pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles,
an account creditor usually carries accounts receivable on its
books at a discount. The account creditor discounts debts to
98. HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 374, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6330.
99. Id.
100. Furthermore, the "face value" concept of value does not comport with
economic reality. Since accounts receivable represent obligations of third par-
ties to pay sums of money, the probability that such sums will be collected is
less than one hundred percent. Therefore, the economic value of an account
receivable is less than one hundred percent of its face amount.
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book value in anticipation of its inability to collect some ac-
counts, and the choice of an appropriate discount factor is
within the account creditor's discretion. Inasmuch as one of
the purposes of the voidable preference doctrine is to prevent
manipulation by the debtor of the payment of creditors,Ol the
choice of a definition of value which is wholly within the con-
trol of the account creditor seems inappropriate.
Choosing between the remaining possible definitions is
more difficult. Both collection value and market value have
some appeal, as well as significant limitations. These compet-
ing definitions result from two different perspectives. 0 2 The
first perspective is result-oriented. It suggests that the voidable
preference doctrine is designed to allow the bankruptcy trustee
to avoid prebankruptcy transfers which would otherwise result
in the transferee recovering a greater portion of its debt than
other similar creditors. The second perspective is conduct-ori-
ented. It suggests that the voidable preference doctrine is
designed to deter or prevent creditors from accepting or de-
manding transfers from their debtors which will benefit such
creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors.
The collection value approach is result-oriented, while the
market value approach is conduct-oriented. Under the market
value definition, a receivables creditor can determine at any
particular time the "value" of collateral it has received. It can
therefore calculate when, if ever, it is undersecured, and deter-
mine whether a particular transfer would improve its position.
Such a creditor will lose collateral as a voidable preference
only when it has chosen to conduct its business despite notice
that receipt of collateral would be voidable if bankruptcy
ensued.
The collection value approach is, on the other hand, retro-
spective. Since the determination of "value" is postponed until
the receivables are collected, the trustee can determine with
certainty whether a particular receivables creditor was actually
in a better position on the day of bankruptcy than ninety days
earlier. Thus, the trustee can avoid any transfer which results
in an improvement in position without regard to whether this
result could have been predicted.
To the extent that the market value of a particular set of
receivables coincides with the money actually collected with
101. See J. WmrE & . SuMMERs, supra note 2, at 999.
102. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 5, for an excellent analy-
sis of voidable preference problems from different perspectives.
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respect to them, the choice between these two definitions is ir-
relevant, since each will yield the same result. The choice of
definition is critical, however, when the predictive market value
diverges from the actual collection value. The typical accounts
receivable financer lends its borrower only a portion of the face
amount of the receivables which will secure the loan. The
financer chooses an appropriate percentage to assure that in
the event of default the collateral will be sufficient to repay the
loan. The choice of percentage necessarily incorporates the
sort of predictions regarding the money which will eventually
be collected from the receivables that are inherent in their mar-
ket value. Accordingly, the financer usually will not make a
loan which exceeds the market value of the collateral.103 Thus,
even if the borrower files a bankruptcy petition ninety days af-
ter the loan, no voidable preference will be found under the
market value definition, because the "value" of the collateral
equals or exceeds the amount of the debt ninety days before
bankruptcy. Furthermore, if the market's prediction of the col-
lections as to the receivables proves accurate, no voidable pref-
erence can be found under the collection value definition for
the same reason.
If the predictive market value of the receivables differs
from the actual amount collected, the situation becomes more
complicated. Although under the market value definition there
still cannot be a preference, application of the collection value
approach may yield a different result. If the market value of
the receivables serving as collateral ninety days before bank-
ruptcy was too conservative, and the actual amount collected
exceeds that prediction, the collection value definition will not
result in a preference since a higher determination of the
"value" of the collateral merely renders the creditor even more
oversecured. If, however, the market value was too optimistic,
a preference is possible. If the amount collected, although less
than predicted by the market, is nonetheless greater than the
debt secured by the accounts, there is no preference because
the debt was still oversecured ninety days before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. If, however, the amount collected is
less than the debt, there is a possibility of a preference under
the collection value definition because the creditor was under-
secured ninety days before the petition was filed. If, on the
date the petition was filed, either the collection value exceeds
103. For a discussion of situations in which a financer might loan more than
market value, see note 104 infra.
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the secured debt or the debt exceeds the collection value by a
smaller amount than it did ninety days earlier, a preference
will be found to the extent of this improvement in position. In
this situation, application of the market value definition will
lead to a determination of no voidable preference, while appli-
cation of the collection value approach will allow the trustee to
avoid the financer's security interest in some of the receivables.
Situations in which application of the market value defini-
tion will lead to a voidable preference, while application of the
collection value approach will not, are less likely to occur in the
course of normal accounts receivable financing. To create a
market value preference, the loan must exceed the market
value of the receivables ninety days before bankruptcy. Since
a professional financer is likely to be aware of the market value
of the receivables, a decision to make such a loan is a decision
to place itself in an undersecured position. 0 4 A preference
arises if, by the addition of new receivables, the difference be-
tween the aggregate market value of the borrower's receivables
and the loan at the date of filing in bankruptcy is less than the
amount by which the loan exceeded the market value of the
collateral ninety days earlier. If market value accurately
predicts collections from the receivables, this scenario will also
be a preference under the collection value definition. If, how-
ever, the market value of the receivables ninety days before
bankruptcy was unduly pessimistic, and the sum actually col-
lected equals or exceeds the loan outstanding on that date,
there will be no preference under the collection value approach
because the loan will not have been undersecured on the ear-
lier date. Even if the market value and the collection value of
the receivables existing ninety days before bankruptcy are
equal, there may not be a preference under the collection value
definition. A preference will only arise if the creditor's recov-
ery on the receivables in existence on the date of the bank-
ruptcy results in its being less undersecured than it was ninety
days earlier.
In sum, if the market value of a group of receivables is an
accurate predictor of their collection value, the two definitions
104. The decision to loan more than the market value of the receivables
may result from a number of factors. The financer may assign a higher value to
the receivables than does the market. Alternatively, the financer may be will-
ing to accept greater risks than the market. In addition, the borrower's busi-
ness cycle may be seasonal and the financer is willing to be undersecured at
the time of the initial loan, with the expectation that large accounts receivable
will come into existence later in the cycle.
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will yield common results. The collection value definition, but
not the market value definition, will mandate a preference if
the receivables in existence ninety days before bankruptcy
yield significantly less than predicted. Conversely, the market
value definition, but not the collection value definition, will
mandate a preference if the creditor, based on market-oriented
predictions, would have believed itself undersecured ninety
days before bankruptcy and the receivables yield more than
predicted.
Both the market value and collection value definitions,
moreover, emphasize a different policy goal associated with the
voidable preference doctrine. Insofar as the two definitions di-
verge, the choice of one over the other should, if possible, re-
flect Congress's view of the aims of the voidable preference
doctrine. A choice of the collection value definition would re-
flect a result-oriented goal, while a choice of the market value
definition reflects a conduct-oriented goal. Although the legis-
lative history of the Code reveals no intention regarding the
definition of "value,"'105 it does provide some indication of the
policies underlying the federal doctrine of voidable prefer-
ences. The House Judiciary Committee, in its report on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act,106 found that under the 1898 Act the
purposes of the voidable preference doctrine were two-fold:
First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that
occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discour-
aged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his
slide into bankruptcy .... Second, and more important, the prefer-
ence provisions [of the 1898 Act] facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy
of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor-
that received a greater payment than others of his class is required to
disgorge so that all may share equally.' 0 7
The first of the two purposes--deterrence-was, of course, "op-
erative only if the creditor was aware of the risk of loss.108
Thus, it was conduct-oriented. The second purpose-equality--
had no conduct-oriented dimension; it was result-oriented.
The conduct-oriented purpose of the 1898 Act was embod-
ied in section 60b,109 which provided that a trustee could avoid
a preferential transfer only if the creditor, at the time of trans-
105. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
106. H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 374, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6330.
107. Id. at 177-78, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws at 6137-39.
108. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547
of the Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 289, 291 (1980).
109. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act of June 22,
1938, Pub. I No. 75-696, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840.
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fer, had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor [was] insol-
vent.""10 Thus, the 1898 Act required an element of intentional
conduct or acquiescence by the transferee in order to create a
voidable preference. Section 547, however, has eliminated the
requirement of notice of insolvency as a prerequisite to
voidability. The Judiciary Committee, commenting on this de-
letion, observed:
This provision [§ 60b] was designed when the primary purpose of the
preference section was to prevent the race of diligence. Whether or not
a creditor knows or believes that his debtor is sliding into bankruptcy
is important if the only purpose of the preference section is to deter
the race. However, a creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to
do with the policy of equality of distribution, and whether or not he
knows of the debtor's insolvency does little to comfort other creditors
similarly situated who will receive that much less from the debtor's es-
tate as a result of the prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor.
To argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a
preference and that creditors should not be required to disgorge what
they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy
policy of equality among creditors. 111
Although this statement does not address the meaning of
"value" in subsection 547(c) (5), it does suggest legislative ap-
proval of a result-oriented preference policy. Because the col-
lection value definition shares this result-oriented perspective,
collection value would appear to match most closely the intent
of Congress.
The choice of a collection value definition, however, would
add an element of risk to the financer's calculus of decision-
making concerning the loan. The risk that a loan which never
appears to be undersecured may, nonetheless, be found to be
secured by preferential transfers is likely to cause financers to
change their lending practices. They may raise their interest
rates for accounts receivable financing to reflect the increased
probability of loss. In addition, they may lend borrowers a
smaller percentage of the face amount of their accounts receiv-
able to minimize the likelihood of being undersecured. Finally,
they may refuse to make loans which otherwise would have
been made to financially uncertain enterprises. Each of these
responses has a potentially serious impact on businesses that
rely on accounts receivable financing.
There is an alternative, however, to the exclusive use of the
collection value definition. That alternative is to tailor the defi-
nition to the situation. The ultimate goal of the subsection
110. Id.
111. H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6138-39.
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547(c) (5) improvement in position test is to determine whether
the secured creditor is in a better position than it would have
been had bankruptcy been declared ninety days earlier. An in-
dividualized definition that answers that question for each par-
ticular creditor, rather than a general definition, may result in a
more accurate appraisal of the creditor's improvement in
position.
An individualized approach need be neither difficult to ap-
ply nor arbitrary. In each bankruptcy proceeding, the creditor
or the trustee at some point liquidates the accounts receivable
constituting collateral. This can be done either by collecting
the accounts or by selling them. To determine whether the
creditor is in a better position than it would have been had
bankruptcy been declared ninety days earlier, the appropriate
comparison would seem to be between the proceeds of the re-
ceivables actually liquidated after bankruptcy and the amount
which would have been obtained if the receivables serving as
collateral ninety days earlier had been liquidated in the same
manner. In other words, if the receivables at bankruptcy were
liquidated by collection, the comparison should be with the
amounts actually collected from receivables serving as collat-
eral ninety days before bankruptcy.112 If the receivables were
liquidated by sale, the comparison should be with the amount
which would have been received had the receivables serving as
collateral ninety days before bankruptcy been sold."13 Thus,
the first example adopts a collection value approach, while the
second uses a market value approach. Because this individual-
ized approach defines "value" in accordance with the method
actually chosen to transform the accounts receivable to cash, it
more accurately measures how much a particular creditor actu-
ally improved its eventual position during the ninety days,
before bankruptcy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The failure of Congress to define "value" in subsection
112. Bankruptcy proceedings, however, may discourage some account debt-
ors from paying the amounts they owe. Accurate determination of the
financer's improvement in position might therefore require a reduction of the
amount actually collected from the earlier receivables to reflect the receivables
which would not have been collected had bankruptcy occurred at the earlier
date.
113. For an accurate comparison, the determination should be made assum-
ing that bankruptcy proceedings were commenced prior to the sale of the
receivables.
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547(c) (5) of the Code will result in serious problems for busi-
nesses dependent on accounts receivable financing. The uncer-
tainty as to the definition and, therefore, the validity of security
interests in accounts receivable may lessen the availability or
raise the cost of this financing for businesses which need it
most. Furthermore, the definition of value which is most con-
sistent with the sparse indications of legislative intent-collec-
tion value-itself adds some uncertainty to the process and,
thus, would further decrease the availability or raise the cost of
accounts receivable financing. Resolution of the definitional
problem through the use of definitions tailored to the facts of
particular cases may result in treatment by the courts in a
manner more consistent with the underlying purposes of the
voidable preference doctrine than would result from applica-
tion of one consistent definition to all cases.

